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This article examines four periods of environmental policy-making in the Amazon region of Brazil. It
speciﬁcally analyses the role of pro-environment and pro-development policy networks in affecting
policy design and implementation. It argues that the efforts of environmentalist networks trying to
advocate or block relative developmentalist policies in the Amazon depend on three critical factors—
whether they are able to attract the support of elites (or at least block their developmentalist policy
initiatives); the type and level of international support they have; and the organizational and ﬁnancial
resources that they are able to mobilize. In analysing the four periods, this article ﬁnds that while
international inﬂuences and resources havebeen substantial in enablingenvironmentalistnetworks to
ﬂourish and inﬂuence the policy, their effectiveness has been nearly always outweighed by Brazilian
developmentalist interests. The outcome in each phase has been a different form of stalemate on
environmental protection, and the deforestation continued each time, albeit at slower rates. These
ﬁndings suggest that the key for signiﬁcantly lower rates of deforestation on the Amazon maybe in the
ability of pro-environment networks to neutralize opposition by creating an incentive structure that
‘compensates’ potential losers of policies that promote conservation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The rate at which Amazon forests are destroyed is the
result of many factors, including economic trends and
incentives, population migration and growth, urban-
ization, property rights and enforcement of environ-
mental laws. Several of these are the direct result of a
complex and pitched struggle over the formation and
implementation of land- and resource-use policies of
the region. This paper focuses on the efforts of
policy networks trying to advocate or block relatively
developmentalist or environmentalist policies in the
Amazon in light of three critical factors—whether they
are able to attract or neutralize domestic elites; the type
and level of international support they have; and the
organizational and ﬁnancial resources they are able to
mobilize.Thesefactorslargelydeterminewhether these
networks succeed or fail. For analytical purposes,
we divide these networks into two camps, named as
pro-environment and pro-development; keeping in
mind that the depiction of the struggle over policy-
making in the Amazon as a dichotomy between
these two networks is oversimpliﬁcation of a complex
and heterogeneous, socioecological system in which
conﬂicting interests and ﬂuid allegiances form and
reformdependingontheissuegalvanizingmobilization.
Within the pro-environmental network, for example,
actors may disagree about their support to indigenous
and other ‘social’ causes or the different strategies to
foster conservation cum development, but agree to the
needfor measuresthatcurbuncontrolleddeforestation.
1
We carry our analysis across four periods of
environmental policy-making in the Amazon that are
representative of the struggle to use or conserve its
forests. They are the state-led ‘colonization’ period of
the Transamazo ˆnica/Polamazo ˆnia in the 1960s–1980s;
the PPG-7/Planaﬂoro donor-led socio-environmental
management period of the 1990s; the state-led pro-
development planning (Avanc ¸a Brazil and Plano
de Acelerac ¸a ˜o do Desenvolvimento—Programa de
Acelerac ¸a ˜o do Crescimento (PAC))/soya frontier
expansion era of the early 2000s; and the Avoided
Deforestation/Compensated Reduction (AD/CR)
phase potentially emerging today. Across these four
periods, one can see the policy process in the Amazon
as something of a see-saw, in which the weight
of policy-making shifts from pro-development to pro-
environment agendas, and back. The key to which side
gains control of federal and local policy-making is the
result of the players they bring into their networks:
some provide numbers; others, weight.
Historically, in making environmental policy in Brazil,
local and national actors battle in a complex and
shifting arena, but the process has moved from being
mostly an insulated technocratic and elite-dominated
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inclusionary process today. The diversiﬁcation of the
policy arena has led to the formation of dynamic policy
networks that position themselves vis-a `-vis different
environmental problems. These ﬂuid networks inte-
grate domestic and global interests as well as actors
across the state-society divide. Both pro-development
and pro-environment networks seek to inﬂuence public
opinion and claim to speak for the national or global
public interest (Fearnside 2003, p. 757).
Policy networks are ‘public, semi-public and
private actors participating in certain policy ﬁelds’
(Kickert et al. 1997). Within these networks, actors
are dependent on each other to reach their goals
and employ a variety of strategies to interact with the
state and other organized interests (Klijn 1996;
Blom-Hansen 1997). Networks are ‘lighter on their
feet’ than more formal coalitions or alliances, and
have been especially effective in using information
and shaming in forcing changes in the behaviour of
their adversaries (Keck & Sikkink 1998). Networks
seek to inﬂuence both policy itself and the rules of
the arenas where these policies form.
(a) Patterns of environmental policy-making
in Brazil and the Amazon: background
and developmentalism
Historically, environmental policy-making in Brazil
resembles a see-saw: on one side we ﬁnd development-
alism that understands natural resources (including
clear air and water) as the raw materials of economic
growth. On the other side is socio-environmentalism
that, although not necessarily denying the need for
economic growth, often believes the price paid so far by
Brazil’s nature, indigenous peoples and the poor is too
high. In practice, this see-saw is populated by different
networks of domestic and international actors across
the public/private divide. Membership in these net-
works is neither static nor exclusive and at times actors
will ﬂip from one side to the other.
In the wake of the Brazilian economic ‘miracle’ of
the 1960s and 1970s, the belief that resources were
inﬁnite, and that growth was always good, was perhaps
the only consensus among business, government and
popular classes (Camargo 1989). Even among the
opposition, criticism focused on social inequality and
completely ignored its environmental consequences
(Viola 1987). Brazil’s patrimonial order created a
policy-making apparatus in which the state was often
the sole actor responsible for deﬁningand decidinghow
to explore the country’s natural resources. In the
Amazon, the state’s reach often exceeded its grasp,
but the military government was able to take control of
tremendous swaths of territory and land-use decisions
outside these axes (Santos 1981; Bunker 1985;
Schmink & Wood 1993; Roberts & Thanos 2003).
This pattern of exclusionary policy-making was
reinforced by the predominance of technocratic
insulation through which well-placed te ´cnicos within
the state apparatus were able to design and implement
policy, virtually unaccountable to the rest of Brazil’s
society (Lemos 1998). Many of the government
agencies created to manage natural resources were
more interested in the exploitation of these resources
than concerned with conserving them or adopting
sustainable development approaches.
The growth project spearheaded by the military
dictatorship (1964–1985) included, ﬁrst, the geopoli-
tical concern to ‘occupy’ the Amazon region. Second, it
sought to induce rapid economic growth through the
building of roads such as the Transamazon and the
establishment of ﬁscal and institutional incentives for
large private- and state-owned business to acquire wide
swathsoflandforcattleranching, lumberingandmining
projects (Hecht 1985). At the same time, the construc-
tion of large infrastructure projects (e.g. roads, dams,
etc.) acted as a magnet for large Brazilian construction
ﬁrms to increase their inﬂuence on the side of
development (Foweraker 1981; Pompermeyer 1984).
In 1973, the military government enacted an
important piece of environmental legislation and
created the Special Secretariat of the Environment
(SEMA) under the supervision of the Ministry of the
Interior, primarily as a way to diffuse harsh inter-
national criticism to the government’s environmental
performance (Viola 1987). Despite SEMA’s limited
range and power, the 1973 law represented a critical
political opportunity for environmentalism and
environmental groups to emerge as credible players in
environmental policy-making. Another factor strength-
ening the inﬂuence of pro-environment networks
was the radicalization of the Brazilian environmental
movement as it became involved, together with other
grass-roots movements, in the mobilization against the
authoritarian regime and the design of Brazil’s new
democratic constitution in 1985 (Viola 1987).
As the rate of destruction of the Amazon forest
skyrocketed and the level of international awareness
increased, new players emerged trying to inﬂuence
environmental policy-making for the region. These
included the media—which periodically invited atten-
tion to environmental problems, stirred up public
opinion and kept environmental issues alive in the
public’s mind—international and domestic NGOs,
and celebrities mobilized against mega-development
projects associated with high rates of forest loss.
Two of these projects were particularly critical to
mobilize domestic and international support for con-
servation.Theﬁrstprojectinvolvedthedevelopmentofa
huge mining project, Caraja ´s, which was ﬁnanced by
loans from the World Bank, private banks and prospec-
tive iron buyers around the world (Roberts & Thanos
2003; Rodrigues 2004). The project mobilized strong
opposition from environmental groups and encouraged
the formation of pro-environmental coalitions which
included both domestic and international NGOs. The
second project was Polonoroeste, also funded by the
WorldBank,toassistthecolonizationofsmallfarmersin
Rondo ˆnia state. Environmental organizations such as
Friends of the Earth UK, the Environmental Defense
Fund, Conservation International and the Natural
Resources Defense Council brought some disturbing
details to the attention of the European Commission
(EC) and the US Congress about World Bank-funded
‘megaprojects’,includingCaraja ´sandPolonoroeste.The
EC threatened to boycott Caraja ´si r o ni fc h a r c o a l -
burning pig iron smelters were built. An unusual
coalition of environmentalists and ﬁscal conservatives
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Banking, Senate Foreign Operations and other commit-
teeswhothreatenedtheBank’s‘replenishments’unlessit
addressed detailed concerns about its projects’ environ-
mental impacts (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Roberts &
Thanos 2003; Hicks et al.2 0 0 8 ). In 1985, the Bank
responded to these threats by suspending disbursements
to the Polonoroeste settlement project in the Amazon.
In the western Amazon states of Acre and Rondo ˆnia,
the Brazilian government responded by creating the
‘Project for the Protection of the Environment and
Indian Communities’ (PMACI) which allowed them to
receive funding from the World Bank and the
Inter-American Development Bank for paving highway
BR-364 (Woodword 1989; Allegreti et al.1 9 9 8 ). The
Union of IndigenousNationsinAcre joinedtheirformer
enemies, the National Council of Rubber Tappers,
forming the Amazonian Alliance for the Peoples of the
Forest.Theassassinationofrubber-tapperleader,Chico
Mendes, in late 1988 brought global attention to the
tensions between the Forest People’s coalition on the
one hand and ranchers and developers on the other. In
the wake of these conﬂicts, the cancellation, delay or
reformulation of major development projects for the
region marked the ﬁrst major ‘wins’ of pro-environment
coalitions in redirecting developmentalism in the
Amazon. They also profoundly changed the way the
World Bank and other major aid agencies funded
development projects in environmentally sensitive
regions of the world.
(b) Donor-led socio-environmental
management: the Planaﬂoro/Plano
Piloto Grupo-7
In the 1990s, a broader consensus began to emerge on
the need to work cooperatively to manage the disorder
and environmental destruction in the Amazon region.
Inﬂuenced by a much better organized and professio-
nalized Brazilian environmental movement—partly as a
result of the 1992 UNCED conference held in Rio de
Janeiro—and by strong international mobilization,
projects such as the Planaﬂoro, Podeagro and the
PPG-7 (Pilot Programme to Conserve the Brazilian
Rain Forest) changed the tone and direction of the
debate to diffuse some of the greatest tensions between
developmentalism and conservationism in the region
(Mello 2005; Redwood 2005). The new coalition for
sustainable development in the Amazon included both
international and domestic NGOs, supportive ofﬁcials
within the World Bank, western developed countries
and Brazilian governments, epistemic communities of
scientists, and grass-roots groups, such as rubber
tappers and indigenous people.
At the 1990 G7 summit in Houston, Texas, German
chancellor Helmut Kohl led an effort to develop a
proposal with four goals, including conserving biodi-
versity, reducing rainforest contributions to climate
change, demonstrating that sustainable development is
possible in tropical forests, and showing that the North
and South can cooperate on global environmental
issues (Redwood 2005). The PPG-7 funded 181 small
projects in the next 8 years, supportingthe demarcation
of 45 Mha of indigenous reserves and four federal
extractive reserves; new participatory methods for
project implementation brought in university pro-
fessors and NGOs as active participants (Allegreti
et al. 1998; Mello 2005; Redwood 2005).
These projects went far beyond technocratic
management of forests: they sought to manage whole
sets of people in civil society groups, the private sector
and the state. They also sought to shift incentives and
policies and build capacity to conserve biodiversity and
provide sustainable livelihoods in the Amazon region,
focusing often on agroforestry systems in suitable areas
and ‘agro-ecological zoning’. Stakeholders including
local, national and international development and
environmental groups were invited to participate in
the project’s reviews (Redwood 2005, p. 103).
However, ecological zoning of land use proved nearly
impossible in the face of resistance from a pro-
development coalition that included loggers, ranchers
and farmers (Redwood 2005; Killeen 2007).
Thus the 1990s ushered in a new era in the Brazilian
Amazon, which we would characterize as ‘donor-led
socio-environmental management’. Some of the pro-
jects of the Planaﬂoro/Prodeagro and PPG-7/Probio/
FunBio failed to move forward or accomplish their
goals because they were opposed and undermined by
politicians and economic elites at the local or state
levels and because they were very poorly executed
(Fearnside 2003; Killeen 2007). The overall achieve-
ments of this innovative donor-led effort to manage
biological and social systems at the same time were
signiﬁcant, but while demonstration projects and
even an institutionalization of social movement
organizations and research institutions occurred in
the 1990s (only partly as a result of the projects),
deforestation rates remained high.
(c) Avanc ¸a Brasil/Plano Plurianual PPA/PAC
and the soya frontier expansion period
After outside attention on the region died down by the
mid-1990s, the Brazilian government set out a 7 year,
US$10–40 billion, set of projects to boost its infra-
structure and exports for the Amazon. Named Avanc ¸a
Brasil (Forward Brazil), the project called for the
paving of thousands of kilometres of Amazon roads,
the deepening and straightening of key rivers for
shipping, the construction of ports and dams, the
expansion of power lines, the exploration of gas and
oilﬁelds (and construction of pipelines) and the
granting of logging concessions. Much of this develop-
ment was geared to provide a cheaper outlet to the sea
for soya farmers in Brazil’s booming Centre-West
agricultural belt (Ministe ´rio do Planejamento 2001b).
Plans to pave the old rutted dirt roads that often
become impassable in the rainy season were perhaps
the most contentious part of Avanc ¸a Brasil. At the
centre of the controversy was the BR-163, a 1970s-era
dirt highway which slices into the heart of almost intact
Amazon forest from Cuiaba ´ in soya-producing Mato
Grosso state to Santare ´m, in Para ´.
If fully implemented, Avanc ¸a Brasil was foreseen to
have severe consequences for the Amazon forest.
Scenario-based studies predicted a range of negative
impacts for biodiversity, climate and natural resources
conservation in the region for the following 20 years
(Laurance et al. 2001; Soares-Filho et al. 2006).
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2 opposition to Avanc ¸a Brasil remained high until
the end of the Cardoso administration (1995–2002).
Many proposed projects were placed on a slower track,
and the Brazilian government, mostly owing to lack of
funds, quietly abandoned others. The following admin-
istration of Luis Inacio Lula da Silva replaced Avanc ¸a
Brasil with the Programa de Acelerac ¸a ˜od oC r e s c i m e n t o
(PAC) with a similar developmentalist agenda for the
Amazon region. And similarly to Avanc ¸a Brazil,
opposition soon emerged. For example, groups such as
Greenpeace have launched aggressive campaigns expos-
ing the perils of development-oriented policy including
lumbering and soya agribusiness. In 2006, Greenpeace
brokered both a moratorium on soya from recently
cleared forests and an agreement with several European
retailers not to purchase soya from Amazon grain
terminals (Greenpeace 2006a,b). The environmentalist
campaign led to a promise by Mato Grosso Governor
and soya magnate Blairo Maggi to freeze soya frontier
expansion in the state for 2 years. However,the apparent
compromise solution will be the paving of BR-163, but
with a new set of protected areas along the highway and
no services along the road. We see this untested strategy
as essentially a ‘quid pro quo’ between the two opposing
policy networks, reﬂecting a stalemate in the process.
(d) Trade or aid? Avoided Deforestation/
Compensated Reductions proposals and
the Amazon
In view of tropical deforestation’s estimated role in
carbon emissions—10–25% of global human-induced
carbon emissions and 60% of Brazil’s greenhouse gas
emissions (Santillietal.2005;Ebeling2006,2008)—itis
not surprising that a new policy network has emerged to
advocate for solutions that both decrease emissions and
protect the Amazon’s threatened natural resources and
biodiversity. Santilli et al. (2005, p. 270) suggest the
concept of compensated reductions that would allow
developingcountriestoparticipateintheKyotoProtocol
by electing to reduce their national emissions from
deforestation during the 5 years of the ﬁrst commitment
period (taking average annual deforestation over some
agreed period in the past, measured with robust
satellite imagery techniques, as a baseline). Under one
approach, these countries would then be authorized to
issue carbon certiﬁcates, similar to the Certiﬁed Emis-
sions Reductions (CERs) of the Clean Development
Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol that could be sold to
governmentsorprivateinvestors.Thisschemeisthecore
of the Papua New Guinea/Coalition for Rainforest
Nations(PNG/CRN)proposal,announcedinlate2005.
The PNG/CRN proposal for Avoided Deforestation
(AD) contains a key issue that Brazil fears, namely the
provision that countries having received compensations
would face mandatory future CO2 reductions. Brazil’s
historical opposition to any approaches that would
help Annex 1 countries to reach Kyoto targets, at
the ‘expense’ of less developed countries, has been
mentioned as a factor to explain the country’s
reluctance to join the Coalition of Rainforest
Countries. The Brazilian government defends this
position based on protecting ‘the scientiﬁc integrity of
the Kyoto Protocol’ (Ikeda 2007, personal communi-
cation to J.T.R.). However, there is wider agreement
around the idea that opposition is more critically
informed by the possibility that AD would negatively
impact the price of CERs and the country’s ability to
attract ‘regular’ CDM projects already worth millions
of dollars. Other reasons include Brazil’s reluctance to
forego potential future development and its fear that
deforestation could become a focus of international
attention to the detriment of the country’s image.
Finally, historical focus on conspiracy theories about
the internationalization of the Amazon (Fearnside
2001a) may also explain resistance from some sectors
of the Brazilian society to subscribe to AD as a carbon
offsetting mechanism.
An array of public and private actors has emerged as
stakeholders around this issue both domestically and
internationally, and policy networks have formed
seeking to inﬂuence the evolution of the issue in the
public policy-making process. Internationally among
the groups supporting AD as a carbon offsetting
mechanism are large NGOs such as World Wide
Fund for Nature, Conservation International, The
Nature Conservancy and Environmental Defense Fund
(Fearnside2001b).Theproposalhasalsobeenendorsed
by other groups of countries such as the Paciﬁc Island
Forum, European Union, British Commonwealth,
African Union and Association of Small Island States
andprofessional organization suchas the Association for
Tropical Biologyand Conservation (Laurance 2007). In
contrast, earlier, a number of European NGOs opposed
AD on the grounds that it would allow wealthy nations
such as the US to ‘get away with’ not reducing their
emissions if cheap carbon offsetting is an option.
However, the magnitude of the problem as well as the
technical improvements in the new proposal (especially
in addressing ‘leakage’ of projects) has softened their
opposition to AD (Laurance 2007). Domestically,
groups such as the Brazilian Forum of NGOs and Social
Movements for Environment and Development, focus
on the opportunity AD provides for attracting critical
resources for forest maintenance and community
development (Fearnside 2001a).
Not surprisingly, domestic opposition to AD is
represented by a number of familiar interests across the
development/conservation axis (Fearnside 2001a;
Santilli et al. 2005). The Labour Party controlled
EnvironmentalMinistry(MMA)hasagreed‘tocarefully
contemplate the proposal’ (Laurance 2007, p. 21).
Among detractors are regional developmentalist inter-
ests supporting the economic growth plans and nation-
alist sectors within the Brazilian government concerned
both with sovereignty issues and potential loss of
future development options (Laurance 2007) as well
as possible negative effects of forest-based schemes
in threatening Brazil’s ability to attract CDMs
and the technology transferred through these
projects (Ebeling 2006, 2008; Hall 2008). Within the
Amazon, another set of actors is likely to arise in
opposition to AD/CR schemes which have been little
exploredanddiscussedsofar(Costa2007).Compensat-
ing land users to not produce on a piece of land will
create major (negative) multiplier effects in the local
economy, Costa argues, by reducing the opportunities
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In this scenario, international support and political
opportunity have a critical role to play in the way these
networks go about pushing for the conﬂicting policy
agendas.Theglobalcharacteroftheclimatechangeissue
coupled with the formalization of its global governance,
may provide the environmentalist network with an
opportunity to build international support and pressure
opposing interests within Brazil, similar to what
happened in the cases of the Polonoroeste and Caraja ´s
programmes20yearsbefore.However,thisapproachcan
backﬁre if it stirs entrenched fears in Brazil’s society
against the ‘internationalization’ of the Amazon.
3 In
order to be successful, any AD proposal will have to be
‘backed up’ by concrete beneﬁts that compensate for
what is perceived as foregone opportunities for develop-
ment and strongly shift economic incentives and provide
local social development (Killeen 2007; Hall 2008).
What this means for distributing compensation,
especially at the local level, remains entirely unspeciﬁed;
we discuss this point further in the concluding section.
(e) Incentives, compensation and policy
networks: analysis/conclusion
Through the four stages of Amazon history, the overall
trend has been one of continuing deforestation, but the
situation and players have changed in important ways.
The networks forming around the issue of climate/
forests are constantly repositioning themselves in terms
of political opportunity, international pressure and
organizational resources.
In this context, the World Bank has played an
important role as it has moved from one side (funding
settlements in Rondo ˆnia, along the Transamazon High-
way and the Caraja ´s mining project in the 1980s) to the
other(sustainableagroforestryandparticipatoryprojects
in the 1990s). The slow political opening of Brazil to
relative democracy in the 1980s also played a decisive
part in allowing an opportunity for environmentalists,
rubber tappers and indigenous peoples to organize. In
spiteofhighexpectationsfromcitizens’groups,theriseof
theWorkers’Partyrepresentsonlyanambiguouswindow
ofopportunityforenvironmentalismandanewmodelin
the Amazon. While some of the projects of the Avanc ¸a
Brasil/PAC proposal have been quietly moved off the
front burner,the paving of the BR-163, the construction
of the Madeira dams and other elements of opening the
region to global trade (especially exports such as soya)
remain in place under the new government.
The AD proposal represents a clear split in
bureaucracies in the Brazilian state and potentially a
major shift that might bring billions of dollars to the
region in return for serious efforts to slow the
devastation. The AD/CR proposal is potentially
important globally because it represents the ﬁrst time
that ‘losers’ in the climate regime will be directly
compensated for foregone economic gains from their
helping the world address this problem. However,
many uncertainties characterize the design of an
effective institutional arrangement that meets carbon
offsetting and conservation goals, while having a
realistic chance of blocking developmentalist networks’
opposition. Part of the problem is what sectors and
actors are slated to win or lose if AD/CR is imple-
mented. Some observers fear that national, state or
local bureaucracies or even corrupt politicians would
siphon off a substantial proportion of the funds, for
example. Others worry that such schemes will fail to
address the poverty and inequalities which underlie
small farmers’ and colonists’reasons to continue felling
forested areas, and the desperation of Brazil’s poor that
provides cheap and exploitable labour on the frontier.
In conclusion, we would argue that international
inﬂuences and ﬁscal resources have been substantial in
determining the outcome of the four different phases,
but in the end they are nearly always outweighed
by Brazilian actors in the developmentalist policy
network. This historical analysis suggests that devel-
opmentalist blocking coalitions will be unlikely to be
diffused until economic incentives are strongly reversed
and they perceive pro-environment schemes as a
potential source of resources.Transparency in account-
ing and distribution of any funding to come for AD/CR
is crucial, and funding must get down to the local
people who will be asked to forego the income they
would have made from selling logs, soya, beef or other
products produced on rainforest land, or from wages
foregone from the halting of such production. As Costa
points out, different types of land users may be giving
up different probable incomes by agreeing not to
produce on a piece of land (2007). Furthermore,
stopping or sharply reducing agricultural production in
a region is likely to have a series of consequences that
must be considered for such a plan to succeed. The
earliest distributions of AD/CR funds will be critical in
either supporting a positive model for this programme
or spreading cynicism in the Amazon. And while
international actors play an important role in Amazon
policy-making, their inﬂuence is uncertain for the
AD/CR case, since, as always, Brazil will have the last
say and will restructure the bargain to its advantage.
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ENDNOTES
1Within Brazil, groups that support both environmentalism and
indigenous and popular movements causes are known as socio-
environmentalists.
2Just 5 days after the Science article was published, Brazil’s Secretary
of Planning and Strategic Investments, Jose ´ Paulo Silveira, held a
press conference to state that Avanc ¸a Brasil did not include 1 km of
new roads and the waterways were chosen to be developed for their
lesser impact (Ministerio de Planejamento 2001a). Silveira said,
‘The predictions of deforestation are exaggerated and do not reﬂect a
more careful analysis of future scenarios, rather, they are based on
data from 20 years ago before Brazil had environmental laws’.
3For example, in October 2006, Marina Silva and Celso Amorim,
Ministers of Environment and International Relations, respectively,
in an open editorial in the Folha de Sa ˜o Paulo, vehemently
denounced any plans to ‘internationalize the Amazon’ coming from
western countries (in this case, the UK). Folha de Sao Paulo, ‘A
Amazo ˆnia na ˜o esta ´ a venda’, 17 October 2006.
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